Somalia’s Strategic Jihadi
Af wax cunay, xishow. – Oh mouth, you have eaten something, now keep quiet.
– Somali proverb [1]
Al-Shabaab sustains its insurgency in Somalia through a dual strategy that combines calculated violence with governance simulation, applied in two distinct phases.
In contested areas (Phase I), Al-Shabaab employs strategic terrorist attacks to sever civilian ties with the federal government, provoke destabilizing overreactions, and undermine public trust in state authority. Simultaneously, it leverages clan dynamics to forge tactical alliances, gaining local access and legitimacy while avoiding overreliance on any single faction.
Once territorial control is established, the group transitions to consolidation (Phase II): simulating statehood through functioning shadow institutions, public service delivery, and a coercive but predictable justice system. Violence becomes institutionalized, fostering obedience through fear, while the group's relative order and efficiency are perceived as preferable to government dysfunction.
This phased dual strategy enables Al-Shabaab to maintain resilience and population control despite its brutality. Its ability to adapt to territorial conditions and fill governance vacuums ensures continued operational strength in the face of ongoing counterinsurgency efforts.
Al-Shabaab's Strategic Terrorism as a Means of Disorientation and Separation
Al-Shabaab’s 'strategic terrorism' can be understood in three phases: (i) disorientation, (ii) target response, and (iii) the pursuit of legitimacy.
First, Al-Shabaab works to sever ties between civilians and the state by spotlighting government failures. In a context like Somalia – where social cohesion is built on oral tradition and mutual trust – this tactic is especially destabilizing. When that foundational trust is broken, the societal impact is profound, leaving communities disoriented and vulnerable.
The second stage of the group’s strategy targets the state’s response. Their attacks are often calculated to provoke overreach or indiscriminate repression. By pushing authorities into reacting too harshly, too little, or targeting moderates, the insurgents exploit these missteps to weaken state legitimacy and drive neutral actors into their fold. In Kenya, for instance, relatively small-scale incidents are designed to prompt aggressive security crackdowns on Somali and Muslim populations, deepening resentment and bolstering recruitment. The effectiveness of this approach lies in prompting the state to act against its own interests – either by alienating the public or eroding its own capacity to govern. Adding to this effect is the ambiguity around responsibility for violence, which erodes the clarity of authority and heightens public distrust. In such an environment, distinctions between insurgents and official actors often blur, reinforcing fear and skepticism.
The third and final phase focuses on constructing political legitimacy. Violence gives way to governance efforts and grassroots engagement, positioning Al-Shabaab not just as a force of disruption but as an alternative source of order. This dual strategy – combining coercion with provision – enables the group to exert long-term influence over communities. Crucially, Al-Shabaab adjusts its tactics to match the territorial context: relying on terrorist methods when mobile and guerrilla strategies when more embedded. This flexibility allows the group to remain resilient, shifting between confrontation and control depending on the strategic environment.
Through this layered and adaptive approach, Al-Shabaab systematically isolates the population from the state, manipulates state responses to its advantage, and gradually builds the framework to replace government authority with its own.
Clan Alliances as Strategic Gateways to Local Acceptance and Authority
Currently, Al-Shabaab’s relationship with Somali clans is fluid and driven more by strategic pragmatism than consistent ideology. The group’s engagement with clans varies depending on strategic needs – for example, it is more inclined to cooperate when facing strong local resistance. Although Al-Shabaab publicly emphasizes religion as a force to transcend clan divisions, in practice, it often instrumentalizes clan affiliations to achieve its goals.
This adaptable approach allows the group to navigate Somalia’s deeply segmented social structure, forming temporary alliances that enhance both its military reach and political endurance. A major part of its territorial entrenchment lies in cultivating an image of inclusivity across clans – presenting itself as a neutral actor above inter-clan rivalries. It promotes collaborative arrangements, integrating with various clans and factions while subordinating traditional loyalties to its religious and political authority.
Beyond battlefield advantages, these interactions with clan structures serve a broader function: embedding the group into the fabric of local society. By involving clan elders in governance functions – such as tax enforcement, conflict mediation, and mobilization – Al-Shabaab taps into established sources of authority. This co-optation not only strengthens control but also builds grassroots legitimacy. Through this strategy, Al-Shabaab reinforces its presence not merely by coercion, but by anchoring itself within customary systems of influence.
Simulating Statehood to Fill the Void of Governance
Al-Shabaab has evolved from relying solely on coercion to adopting a more complex model that mirrors state governance. Recognizing that sustained control could not be achieved through violence alone, the group shifted its focus toward projecting an image of public-minded governance. Instead of demanding repentance from communities, its rhetoric increasingly emphasizes the delivery of communal benefits and stability.
“Al-Shabaab is masterful at pushing the population to the breaking point, extracting as much as they can and giving as little as they can afford to.”[2]
This evolution reflects a broader transition from a conventional insurgency to a quasi-governmental actor. On the ground, Al-Shabaab has built a functioning institutional framework resembling a state apparatus. Despite its harsh methods, its rule is often viewed as consistent and relatively just when compared to chaotic alternatives. The group maintains a shadow administration with distinct branches responsible for outreach, taxation, regional governance, intelligence, military affairs, and judicial processes. These structures enable it to provide security, impose order, and manage local disputes.
Moreover, Al-Shabaab has created an environment that facilitates economic activity, particularly in trade, livestock, and agriculture. This perceived stability positions the group as a more reliable alternative to both regional warlords and the fragmented national government in Mogadishu.
Al-Shabaab is contrasted with a federal government described as a “paper tiger – [which is] there, but in reality, […] is not really there.”[3]
Crucially, Al-Shabaab gains legitimacy by delivering public services where the federal government has failed. Al-Shabaab strengthens its position in Somalia’s governance landscape by delivering a wide range of essential public services. It operates healthcare facilities, schools, water and sanitation systems, food distribution mechanisms, and emergency response committees for crises like drought and disease outbreaks. These services not only meet immediate needs but also serve as a calculated strategy to undermine confidence in the Somali state. By consistently stepping in where the government is absent or ineffective, Al-Shabaab erodes the perception that official institutions are capable of providing security, jobs, or education.
This service delivery is accompanied by a sustained information campaign. The group actively promotes its governance model while portraying the federal government as corrupt, predatory, and inept. Such messaging fosters a sense of pride among members and supporters, who come to believe that their quality of life and personal security are superior to what state officials can offer. This narrative encourages loyalty and helps the group cultivate legitimacy. Many civilians, especially in areas neglected by the state, begin to feel acknowledged and protected under Al-Shabaab’s rule – forming what resembles a de facto social contract that reinforces the group’s authority.
Among its various administrative efforts, the group’s justice system is especially influential in gaining public trust. Al-Shabaab's courts are seen as efficient, transparent, and accessible – qualities often lacking in state-run legal institutions. Many residents turn to these courts to resolve financial disputes and property claims, appreciating the speed and decisiveness of rulings. The enforcement of these judgments further enhances the perception of Al-Shabaab as a reliable governing force. In contrast, the federal judiciary is often viewed as ineffective or symbolic, leading many to see the insurgents as the more credible alternative. This functional governance – not ideology – is a major reason why some Somalis support or even join the group out of necessity.
Sustaining Rule Through Coercive Security and Predictable Violence
Al-Shabaab’s control, however, is not sustained by services alone. Once it secures territory, the group imposes strict order through intimidation and coercive violence. Compliance is maintained through systematic punishment and fear. The administration relies on public displays of brutality – such as executions and amputations – to deter dissent and assert authority via coercive control. These acts are not incidental, but integral to how Al-Shabaab governs. The group’s intelligence networks further reinforce this environment of surveillance and control, leaving civilians with the sense that they are constantly being watched.
In sum, Al-Shabaab blends service provision with ideological messaging and authoritarian enforcement to build a form of governance that – however violent – proves more stable and responsive than what the state often offers. This blend of coercion, functionality, and perceived fairness helps explain its resilience and continued relevance in Somalia’s fractured political landscape.
Despite its severity, Al-Shabaab is widely seen as a system that, “despite its harshness, is perceived as predictable and somewhat fair.”[4]
Al-Shabaab provides “predictability[, meaning] as long as people adhere to strict rules, they have nothing to fear.”[5] Within Al-Shabaab’s system of governance, many civilians thus accept a troubling tradeoff: surrendering personal freedoms in return for a sense of order, safety, and predictability. Despite this, the group remains responsible for deadly violence against civilians, both as a deliberate strategy and through collateral damage. It operates under a broadened definition of what constitutes a legitimate target – any connection to the Somali federal government, however minor, can result in execution. Even working near government offices or engaging in everyday interactions with officials can be considered grounds for punishment. Through this lens, Al-Shabaab shifts the burden of accountability, presenting itself as more principled or restrained in comparison to the indiscriminate violence often associated with state actors.
Still, the population bears the psychological weight of prolonged exposure to Al-Shabaab’s coercive tactics. After years of conflict and state dysfunction, many no longer distinguish clearly between insurgents and official authorities. For some, the group is seen less as a malevolent force and more as part of a continuum of power in Somalia – harsh, but not uniquely so. In areas with few viable alternatives, people often regard Al-Shabaab’s rule as the lesser of two evils. This resignation is reinforced by the perception that the group, unlike other actors, at least delivers basic services and maintains a certain consistency in its rule.
“[Al-Shabaab] solve[s] many problems and, though not popular, they are not described [by locals] as the worst people on earth. Other Somalis may be.” [6]
Al-Shabaab appears to understand this dynamic well. It capitalizes on the fact that populations are more likely to support those who can improve their daily lives, even if grudgingly. By providing functional governance and ensuring a level of predictability, the group is able to bypass many of the usual political costs that come with its use of violence. Over time, what starts as reluctant tolerance can shift into passive acceptance – or even a measure of support.
Ultimately, Al-Shabaab’s legitimacy does not arise from ideological alignment or popular enthusiasm. Rather, it is a product of comparative effectiveness in delivering governance within a landscape marked by state failure, insecurity, and institutional collapse.
The Future of Al-Shabaab's Legitimacy in Somalia
Al-Shabaab, despite its brutal tactics, maintains population control and resilience in Somalia through its strategic use of terrorism. The group’s strategic use of terrorism serves to sever ties between civilians and the state, isolating the population and making them more reliant on the insurgents for stability. Once territorial control is secured, Al-Shabaab mimics state functions. This dual strategy of terror and governance consolidates its control, positioning the group as a more reliable alternative to the ineffective Somali government. As a result, Al-Shabaab’s fear-based, but reliable and predictable governance is seen as a ‘lesser evil’ compared to the ineffective Somali government.
In this regard, there exists a quiet compliance of the population under Al-Shabaabs fear-based rule, accepting the group’s coercive dominance out of necessity, not enthusiasm – put simply because Al-Shabaab offers something the state has failed to deliver: order.
Notes
[1] Georgi Kapchits, Somali Proverbs: A Study in Popularity (Moscow: The Way, 2002), 22.
[2] Mohamed Mubarak and Ashley Jackson, Playing the Long Game: Exploring the Relationship Between Al Shabab and Civilians in Areas Beyond State Control (London: ODI, August 2023), 9.
[3] Joanne Crouch and Abdi Ali, “Community Perspectives towards Al-Shabaab,” in War and Peace in Somalia, ed. Michael Keating and Matt Waldman (New York: Hurst Publishers, 2019), 456.
[4] Mohamed Mubarak and Ashley Jackson, Playing the Long Game: Exploring the Relationship Between Al Shabab and Civilians in Areas Beyond State Control (London: ODI, August 2023), 24.
[5] Roland Marchal, “Rivals in Governance: Civil Activities of Al-Shabaab,” in War and Peace in Somalia, ed. Michael Keating and Matt Waldman (New York: Hurst Publishers, 2019), 354.
[6] Roland Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War (Paris: Sciences Po, CNRS, March 2011), 9.
