Humanitarian Impact: Mass Displacement and Migration Pressure
The ongoing conflict in Sudan, which escalated with the outbreak of fighting in Khartoum on 15 April, has generated significant spillover effects into South Sudan. Foremost among these are (1) the rapid increase in cross-border displacement and (2) subsequent humanitarian strain.
According to joint border monitoring by UNHCR, IOM, and the South Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), a total of 86,451 individuals had entered South Sudan by 30 May. The demographic breakdown is as follows:
94% (81,284) South Sudanese returnees
3% (2,574) Sudanese nationals
3% (2,593) third-country nationals (notably Eritreans and Somalis)
The Government of South Sudan has so far maintained an open-border policy, granting entry to all incoming persons regardless of nationality or legal status – this includes Sudanese refugees, South Sudanese refugees returning from Sudan, and third-country nationals.
Juba’s immediate strategic priority is to facilitate onward movement from remote and poorly serviced border zones. UNHCR and partner organizations are assisting with the transport of high-risk individuals to transit centers.
Economic Impact: Market Volatility and Energy Security Concerns
Beyond the humanitarian dimension, the Sudanese conflict is exerting acute economic pressure on South Sudan, particularly in the northern states that are reliant on imports from Sudan. Since mid-April:
Fuel prices have surged by up to 60% within two weeks
Basic food prices have increased by more than 30% in some areas
The trend is projected to worsen if hostilities persist.
Of strategic concern to Juba is the possibility of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) targeting critical oil infrastructure, specifically the pipeline and export terminal in Port Sudan that connect South Sudan’s oil fields to international markets. Such a disruption would compromise oil exports operated by Malaysian, Chinese, and Indian companies, all of which depend exclusively on Sudanese transit routes.
Given that oil revenues constitute 90% of South Sudan’s GDP, with an estimated production of 170,000 barrels per day, any disruption to this lifeline would pose a severe destabilization risk. South Sudan is already ranked as Africa’s third most fragile state according to the Government Stability Index.
Should RSF operations threaten this infrastructure, analysts assess that President Salva Kiir’s administration may be compelled to side with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), thereby increasing the likelihood of South Sudan’s involvement in the broader conflict.
Nevertheless, intelligence assessments suggest that neither RSF nor SAF currently has an interest in severing oil flows, as continued exports are economically vital to both parties.
Outlook:
Continued migration inflows are likely, straining humanitarian capacities.
Economic volatility will intensify unless supply routes are stabilized.
Threats to oil infrastructure represent the single most significant strategic risk, with potential to escalate regional involvement.
Data:
UNHCR. "Sudan Emergency CORE Week 03 - New Population Movements from Sudan - South Sudan." Operational Data Portal: Refugee Situations, 12. Mai 2023.
UNHCR. "Sudan Emergency: Regional Refugee Response Plan, May - October 2023 (Six Months)." Refugee Coordination Model (RCM), 17. Mai 2023.
UNHCR. "Sudan Emergency: Regional Refugee Response Plan, May - October 2023 (Six Months)." Refugee Coordination Model (RCM), 17. Mai 2023.
UNHCR. "Sudan Emergency: UNHCR Supplementary Appeal, May - October 2023." Global Focus, 19. Mai 2023
UNHCR. "Sudan Situation - UNHCR External Update #11, 23 - 25 May 2023." UNHCR, 26. Mai 2023.
UNHCR. "Sudan Situation." Operational Data Portal – Refugee Situations, 30. Mai 2023.
